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Abstract
Th e narrative that grounds the asylum policy of the United 
States portrays asylum seekers as passive objects of external 
forces. Th is narrative emerges from the complex interplay 
of exceptionality and victimization that characterizes the 
legal status and popular perception of the refugee. It is then 
read back onto the asylum seeker through a supereroga-
tory asylum policy that is unable to recognize the moral 
demand made by the asylum seeker. Th e project this essay 
is drawn from seeks to challenge the policy of asylum as 
charity by interrogating alternative narratives grounded 
in the Hebrew Bible story of the Exodus and the Qu’ranic 
story of the Hijra. In these narratives, fl ight from oppres-
sion is portrayed as an act of moral agency, and the asylum 
seeker’s capacity as Other to make a moral demand on the 
Self emerges. Th us, I argue that an asylum policy informed 
by these alternative narratives needs must question its 
supererogatory assumptions.
Résumé
Le discours à la base de la politique d’asile des États-Unis 
représente les demandeurs d’asile comme des objets pas-
sifs subissant des forces extérieures. Cette représentation 
émerge de l’interaction complexe entre l’exception et la 
victimisation qui caractérise le statut légal et la perception 
populaire du réfugié. Ce discours est renvoyé au demandeur 
d’asile à travers une politique d’asile surérogatoire qui ne 
reconnaît pas les exigences morales du demandeur d’asile. 
Cet article vise à remettre en question la politique de l’asile 
en tant que charité en faisant appel à des discours dif-
férents prenant leur source dans le récit biblique de l’Exode 
et dans le récit coranique de l’Hégire. Dans ces récits, la 
fuite de l’oppression est représentée comme l’exercice d’une 
capacité morale, et émerge alors la capacité du demand-
eur d’asile dans son altérité de faire une demande morale 
en tant que soi-même. En conséquence, on soutient qu’une 
politique d’asile basée sur ces alternatives doit remettre en 
question les présomptions surérogatoires.
Th e world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of 
being human.
—Hannah Arendt, Th e Origins of Totalitarianism1
Arendt’s critique of the international community’s response to the statelessness crisis of the Second World War is well-known and well-worn in the fi eld 
of refugee studies, but it remains a pointed and poignant 
critique of the limits imposed on refugee subjectivity. Solely 
human—without political affi  liation—the refugee subject 
is an exception to the logic of state-centric legal systems, 
which, in turn, recognize no obligation to the refugee. Th is 
exceptional subjectivity is further entrenched through nar-
ratives about refugees that locate refugee identity in por-
trayals of passive victims upon whom the larger force of 
persecution works. Refugee identity as passive objectivity is 
then reifi ed through supererogatory policies of protection; 
the refugee is again the object of an outside force.
Th e central question of this essay is whether and how it 
is possible to reimagine asylum-seeker subjectivity in a way 
that recognizes the moral demand asylum seekers make 
on receiving states. What follows is an adumbration of and 
introduction to a larger project that aims to challenge the 
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idea of asylum as charity and disrupt the cycle of narrative 
and policy that perpetuates the fi gurative, and consequen-
tially literal, exclusion of asylum seekers.2 In particular, I 
want to examine the ways in which current conceptions 
of asylum-seeker subjectivity obscure the asylum seeker’s 
moral demand and to suggest that alternative narratives 
exist—I draw on the Hebrew Bible story of the Exodus 
and the Qur’anic story of the Hijra—in which fl ight from 
oppression is conceived as an act of moral agency.
Th is article is inspired and informed by the possibility 
inherent in the work of Emmanuel Lévinas and by thinkers, 
in particular Judith Butler, who have taken up the possibil-
ities inherent in Lévinas while struggling with the philo-
sophical abstraction that distances the Lévinasian ethic 
from personal and social experience. It is Lévinas who pro-
vides the theoretical substructure that points to the critique 
of current US asylum policy and suggests the route to a real 
ethics of asylum. For this reason, I start with a brief discus-
sion of Lévinas and the ethical demand of the asylum seeker 
as Other.
Lévinas and the Demand of the Other
From Arendt on, authors discussing refugee subjectivity 
have oft en made recourse to concepts of bare humanity to 
capture the social and political dislocation that occurs in the 
fl ight from persecution, as well as the consequences of such 
dislocation.3 To be a refugee is to have lost the vestiges of 
social belonging, group affi  liation, and associative identity, 
resulting in a profound vulnerability and dependence. Th is 
bare humanity would, seemingly, beget the central moment 
envisioned by Lévinas’s ethics of the face.4 Exposed in her 
bare humanity, the refugee would seem to epitomize the 
conditions of the Lévinasian face:
Stripped of its form, the face is chilled to the bone in its naked-
ness. It is a desolation. Th e nakedness of the face is destitution 
and already supplication in the rectitude that sights me. But this 
supplication is an obligation… . [T]he face imposes on me and I 
cannot stay deaf to its appeal, or forget it, what I mean is I cannot 
stop being responsible for its desolation.5
What animates Lévinasian ethics is the moral obligation 
that the Other makes upon the Self; the Other, in the form of 
the face and by reason of its nakedness and desolation, inter-
rupts the formation of the Self with a precondition of moral 
obligation.6 Lévinas’s argument is a powerful assertion of 
relationality as the fundamental aspect of human experience. 
Even before there is a Self, that Self is already in a relation of 
obligation to the Other. If the moment of impingement, by 
which the Other makes its demand on the Self, occurs through 
the naked visage of the face—the nothing-but-humanness 
of the Other—shouldn’t the refugee’s bare humanity be the 
very occasion of that impingement?
Th at the Lévinasian moral demand of the Other is pre-
conscious, preliteral, and, in the end, preontological—even 
before being there is relation—is the great promise of 
Lévinas’s work, but it also points to the diffi  culty of real-
izing such a vision. In the conscious, concrete world, social 
norms function to obscure the demand of the face.7 As 
Judith Butler writes regarding Lévinas: “Th e ‘inaugura-
tion’ of the subject takes place through the impingement by 
which an infi nite ethical demand is communicated. But this 
scene cannot be narrated in time; it recurs throughout time 
and belongs to an order other than that of time.”8 As soon 
as the “infi nite ethical demand” is confi ned to the genre of 
narrative, it is inscribed in a context conditioned by norma-
tivity and power. Th us, Butler, for whom the constricting 
nature of normativity and power is central, poses the prob-
lem of the encounter with the Other this way:
In asking the ethical question “How ought I to treat another?” I 
am immediately caught up in a realm of social normativity, since 
the other only appears to me, only functions as an other for me, if 
there is a frame within which I can see and apprehend the other 
in her separateness and exteriority. So, though I might think of 
the ethical relation as dyadic or, indeed, as presocial, I am caught 
up not only in the sphere of normativity but in the problematic 
of power when I pose the ethical question in its directness and 
simplicity: “How ought I to treat you?”9
Counter-intuitively, the actual state of bare humanity 
frustrates the Lévinasian ethic by obscuring or obfuscating 
the Other’s face. In Butler’s terms, the frame for understand-
ing the asylum seeker as Other is conditioned by the narra-
tive of the passive victim. Th e Lévinasian face disrupts the 
Self with its demand, but the asylum seeker’s subjectivity is 
understood as passive, without demand. As Arendt wrote, 
“It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the 
very qualities which make it possible for other people to 
treat him as a fellow-man.”10 Or, as Peter Nyers has written 
in a more contemporary context:
Refugee identity is a limit-concept of modern accounts of the 
political and is constituted through an exceptional logic: what-
ever qualities are present for the citizen are notably absent for the 
refugee. Th e visibility, agency, and rational speech of the citizen 
is lacking in the prevailing representations of the refugee. Instead, 
qualities of invisibility, voicelessness, and victimage are allocated 
with the eff ect of eff acing the political subjectivity of the refugee.11
Instead of treating asylum seekers as complex, multi-
faceted fellow humans, their subjectivity is fl attened, 
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reduced to a singular dimension. Th e consequence of this 
reduction is that receiving states recognize no moral obliga-
tion, but conceive of asylum as a form of charity. It is off ered 
unilaterally and at the discretion of the state. As Carol 
Bohmer and Amy Shuman write:
[W]e have a category [of asylum], but we are frightened to use it 
except in the most obvious and sympathetic cases. We fear that if 
we use it too enthusiastically, we will open the fl oodgates to all the 
miserable, needy, people fl eeing war or crisis, so common in our 
current world… . Th e whole process is riddled with fallout from 
this fear… . Asylum seekers are guilty until proven innocent.12
Th is response is not driven simply by the fear of a fl ood of 
human misery washing upon our shores; rather, the charac-
terization of asylum seekers as miserable, needy victims and 
asylum as charitable relief makes rejecting refugees a cog-
nizable option. Th e asylum seeker’s extreme vulnerability is 
an opportunity for state action; because asylum seekers are 
vulnerable and in a position of dependence they are seen by 
the receiving state as objects carried on the tides of greater 
forces, namely persecution and protection.
At fi rst glance, the vulnerability and dependence of 
the asylum seeker would seem to be the conditions for a 
Lévinasian encounter. Confronted with actual asylum 
seekers, however, the question of how we, as receiving 
states, ought to treat them is framed by the passive victim 
narrative. Contextualized in this way, the asylum seeker’s 
vulnerability and dependence—the bare humanity that 
should be a demand—serve to obscure the face and quiet 
the demand.
It is not the case, of course, that no one who requests asy-
lum receives it; moreover, the analysis to this point would 
seem to beg the question: Isn’t asylum—an application-
based procedure—a demand at its heart? Th is next section 
briefl y examines asylum law, in this case US asylum law, in 
order to discuss how the asylum law and procedure reifi es 
the construction of refugee subjects as passive victims and 
nullifi es any moral demand present in the act of seeking 
asylum by requiring that the asylum seeker perform that 
preconceived identity.
Th e Interplay of Asylum Narratives and Asylum 
Law
Whether and how a person meets the defi nition of a refu-
gee, and is therefore eligible for asylum and admitted to the 
United States, is the focus of Section 208 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA):
Th e Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General 
may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in 
accordance with the requirements and procedures established 
by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General 
under this section if the Secretary of Homeland Security or the 
Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within 
the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.13
It is important to note two aspects of the text quoted 
above. First, the grant of asylum is entirely discretion-
ary. Th e Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney 
General may grant asylum, but there is no positive obliga-
tion upon them to do so. Second, eligibility is determined by 
either the Secretary or the Attorney General, which means 
that an asylum seeker must narrate an identity consistent 
with what these offi  cials (or their proxies) consider a refu-
gee’s story.
Skepticism permeates this process. Th e manifest concern 
is that only the “truly needy” should be assisted; therefore, 
the asylum process must be vigilantly policed for fraud and 
merit.14 As Bohmer and Shuman note, “[W]e quiz asylum 
applicants endlessly, to convince ourselves that they are 
really fl eeing persecution and not lying to us so they can 
slip into a safer country in search of a better life.”15 Th is 
concern results in a presumption against the asylum seeker; 
the asylum seeker is presumed not to be a refugee. Th e pre-
sumption against refugee status is evident when looking 
at who is allocated the burden of proof during an asylum 
determination: the asylum seeker must bear the burden of 
proving that she meets the defi nition of a refugee.16 In other 
words, the asylum seeker is presumed not to be a refugee 
unless and until she can prove otherwise. Th e asylum seek-
er’s testimony alone may be suffi  cient if “the applicant satis-
fi es the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, 
is persuasive, and refers to specifi c facts suffi  cient to dem-
onstrate that the applicant is a refugee.”17 Th us, the asylum 
seeker’s burden of proof has three components: a burden of 
credibility, a burden of persuasion, and a burden of fact.18 
Unless the asylum seeker can meet the burdens of credibil-
ity, persuasion, and fact her asylum claim will be denied.
Most problematically for the asylum seeker, she does not 
receive a presumption of credibility; rather, the trier of fact 
is free to determine that an asylum seeker is not credible 
based on any indication of inconsistency.19 Any lapse in an 
asylum seeker’s narrative, “without regard to whether an 
inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of 
the applicant’s claim,” can be the basis for an adverse cred-
ibility determination.20 Th e trier of fact may also demand 
any evidence that the trier of fact determines is necessary to 
corroborate otherwise credible testimony, which evidence 
must be provided “unless the applicant does not have the 
evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”21 In 
an asylum determination, so much turns on the asylum 
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seeker’s ability to maker her case (both fi guratively and 
literally given that she bears the burden of proof), that the 
statutorily inscribed fragility of her credibility is particu-
larly damning. It both refl ects and reinforces the idea that 
the asylum seeker has no power in the relationship.
It is the most clear-cut, sympathetic cases of unambigu-
ous persecution that will be both the most persuasive, most 
credible, and easiest to prove.22 In other words, the story 
one expects to hear is the most compelling. Th e asylum pro-
cess becomes a series of stages for the performance of a pre-
scripted refugee identity. In this context, the Self overdeter-
mines the Other that is narrating. Th e Other must meet a 
set of a priori expectations as to form, content, consistency, 
and veracity. Th e result for asylum seekers is that the asy-
lum seeker’s personal story is oft en and increasingly likely 
to narrate an insuffi  cient account.23
In this way, the asylum application falls short of a 
Lévinasian demand because it compels or obliges nothing 
in terms of response from the receiving state. Instead, a 
demand runs from the receiving state to the asylum seeker 
for the asylum seeker to narrate a prefabricated identity. 
By setting the defi nition of their identity, the conditions of 
their performance, and placing upon them the burden of 
proof, the receiving state takes no risks in the encounter and 
is unchanged by the asylum seeker. Th e refugee as “mere, 
bare, naked, or minimal humanity”24 is a subject to whom 
no duty is owed, but whose plight may warrant a gratuitous 
favour if the story of persecution meets expectations. Th is is 
not the face that interrupts, and it fails to interrupt because 
the face of asylum is a construction created by the receiving 
state.
What would it mean to reconceive asylum seekers as 
agents fulfi lling a moral responsibility? What if, instead 
of simply victims subject to the powers of persecution and 
protection, asylum seekers were understood as engaged 
in a deliberate act of safeguarding their own dignity and 
humanity? In what follows I argue that asylum seekers are, 
in fact, more than bare humanity and when recognized as 
such the cycle of passive victim and charitable state is dis-
rupted. First, I turn to what I believe are compelling alterna-
tive narratives of what it means to fl ee persecution drawn 
from two religious narrative traditions: the Exodus and the 
Hijra.
A Th eological Ethics of Flight
What if, instead of faceless bare humanity and passive 
object of sympathy, the asylum seeker was understood as a 
moral agent fulfi lling an ethical imperative to fl ee persecu-
tion? Th is is the nature of the moral subjects who fl ed Egypt 
under Moses’ guidance and those early Muslims who, with 
the Prophet Muhammad, fl ed the persecution of Mecca for 
the oasis of Medina. An ethic of fl ight holds that persecution 
is an aff ront to our anthropology, and the fl ight from per-
secution is a righteous act to preserve the integrity of what 
Christians might refer to as the imago dei, the image of God, 
or what one scholar of Islamic Studies, Muddathir ‘Abd al-
Rahim, has called, “human dignity . . . graciously conferred 
by God … .”25 Because humanity is tasked to protect its dig-
nity, fl ight from persecution is an act of moral agency. As 
‘Abd al-Rahim notes, “One of the greatest blessings that God 
has graciously conferred on humanity in addition, and one 
that is certainly more germaine [sic] to the dignity which He 
conferred on the children of Adam entire, is that of moral 
autonomy or freedom of choice and conscience.”26
Th e Exodus
Th e Exodus story is usually read as an account of God’s 
delivery of Israel from slavery in Egypt. Accepting that lib-
eration motif, it is worth examining the fl ight aspect and 
what it reveals about the moral agency of the Israelites.27 
Th e second chapter of Exodus closes with God taking notice 
of the suff ering of the Israelites in Egypt.
Th e Israelites groaned under their slavery, and cried out. Out of 
the slavery their cry for help rose up to God. God heard their 
groaning, and God remembered his covenant with Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob. God looked upon the Israelites, and God took 
notice of them. (Exod. 2:23–25)28
Chapter 3 then narrates God’s fi rst intercession with Moses. 
It is here that God announces God’s plan for the Israelites: 
justice for Israel and freedom from persecution will come 
by way of a migration. God commands Moses: “[C]ome, I 
will send you to Pharaoh to bring my people, the Israelites, 
out of Egypt” (Exod. 3:10). God’s delivery from Egypt is 
fulfi llment of the covenant as was already foretold to 
Abraham many generations before29 (Gen. 15:12–21), but it 
is a fulfi llment of the covenant that comes in response to 
Israel’s cries under the persecution of Pharaoh and relies 
upon the Israelites’ action in concert with God. God cre-
ates the conditions that allow the Israelites to fl ee, but it is 
up to the Israelites to make that moral choice. Th e Israelites’ 
capacity for moral agency is refl ected in their initial rejec-
tion of Moses: “Moses told [what God had said] to the 
Israelites; but they would not listen to Moses, because of 
their broken sprit and their cruel slavery” (Exod. 6:9).30 
God does not usurp the Israelites’ agency; rather, God cre-
ates a possibility, which the Israelites must realize through 
their own action.
Th e moral agency of the Israelites’ fl ight is exemplifi ed 
in Moses and Aaron, who are God’s agents before Pharaoh. 
As leaders of the community and moral exemplars, Moses 
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and Aaron’s charge to Pharaoh is refl ective of the narrative’s 
moral commitment. When God sends Moses and Aaron 
before Pharaoh, their edict is clear: Let the Israelites go 
from the land of Egypt (Exod. 7:1–7). God enjoins Pharaoh 
through his agents, Moses and Aaron, to allow the Israelites 
to do their moral duty and fl ee the slavery and persecution 
of Egypt.
Th e Exodus narrative is profoundly infl uential in both 
the Jewish and Christian traditions. Th ough there are num-
erous examples of the importance of this narrative, perhaps 
one of the simplest and yet most explicit can be see in the 
Jewish ritual calendar; the fl ight from persecution inaugur-
ates a new era. “Th e Lord said to Moses and Aaron in the 
land of Egypt: Th is month shall mark for you the beginning 
of months; it shall be the fi rst month of the year for you” 
(Exod. 12:1–2). Th e instruction for the new priestly calen-
dar is given as part of the instructions for the Passover, and 
so it is that the Passover celebration marks the new year in 
the ritual calendar of Judaism. Th e purpose, the teleology, 
of the Passover is the Exodus: “At the end of four hundred 
thirty years, on that very day [Passover], all the companies 
of the Lord went out from the land of Egypt” (Exod. 12:41). 
By fl eeing the persecution in Egypt, the Israelites safeguard 
their dignity, but they also inaugurate a new history; the 
power of this act is not minimal, it is expansive.
Th e Hijra
An act of fl ight also marks the beginning of the Islamic cal-
endar. As ‘Abd al-Rahim notes, 
the day of the Prophet’s hijrah to Medina—neither his birthday, 
nor the commencement of the revelation of the Quran, nor his 
entry in due course into Mecca as the magnanimous conqueror—
was adopted, only a few years aft er his departure from this world 
in 632 C.E., as the beginning of the Muslim calendar and the 
Islamic way of reckoning of time across the ages.31
Th us, as in Judaism, a foundational event that comes to ori-
ent the tradition temporally and theologically is an act of 
fl ight from persecution.
Th e Islamic tradition fi rst emerged in the Arabian city of 
Mecca as the Prophet Muhammad spread his message and 
recruited followers. However, perceiving the new religion as 
a threat to its power and infl uence, the Quraysh, the tribes 
that controlled Mecca and, in particular the holy shrine 
known as the Kaabah, began to persecute the Muslim com-
munity. Sharifah Nazneen Agha describes the persecution 
that early Muslims faced in Mecca:
Muslims of low social status were freely tortured by the Quraysh 
to force a renunciation of the new faith, whilst other persecutory 
measures were imposed to eff ect a complete marginalization 
of the entire Muslim community. Th e prohibition of trade in 
essential goods and provisions was particularly oppressive, and 
resulted in a 3-year period of starvation, acute depravation [sic] 
and certain death.32
In the face of such persecution, the Prophet Muhammad 
initially sent seventy Muslims to seek asylum in the ter-
ritory of King Negus, an Abyssinian Christian, who wel-
comed the band of Muslims and off ered them protection 
in the face of diplomatic and political pressure from the 
Meccans.33 However, the persecution of Muslims in Mecca 
continued. In the interim, the oasis of Medina to the north 
had grown increasingly sympathetic to Islam and had begun 
to accept Muslim refugees from Mecca. Finally, in 622 CE, 
the Prophet Muhammad embarked on what ‘Abd al-Rahim 
describes as the epoch-making migration to Medina that is 
known as the Hijra.34
Th is new era is inaugurated through the early Muslim 
community’s decision to fl ee persecution. Agha puts it 
well when she says: “Th e hijrah event is extraordinary for 
Muslims as it marks the birth of the Islamic age, the onset 
of which was made possible only by decisive action of the 
muhajirun to mobilize and seek refuge in foreign terri-
tory.”35 Th e muhajirun, meaning “emigrants” in Arabic 
and used to describe those early Muslims who undertook 
the Hijra to Medina,36 are moral agents both in their fl ight 
from persecution and in their action to create the condi-
tions to preserve their new religion. It is also worth noting 
the importance of the Prophet Muhammad’s identity as a 
muhajirun and participation in the Hijra. Th e teachings and 
example of the Prophet (sunnah) emerged early in Islamic 
history as second only to the Qur’an in terms of authority.37 
Th us, the Prophet’s decision to fl ee the persecution of Mecca 
and to establish his new religious community through asy-
lum lends further credence to the moral agency of fl eeing 
persecution.
Th e Islamic tradition of recognizing moral agency in 
fl ight is also refl ected in the Qur’an. As Khadija Elmadmad 
notes, “In a sense, seeking asylum is a duty. Muslims are 
not obliged to live in places where there is injustice and per-
secution and they are urged by Islam to leave these places 
and seek protection elsewhere.”38 Th e directive to fl ee in the 
face of persecution appears in the Qur’anic text both as an 
injunction and as an act worthy of reward. Surah 4:97 con-
tains the genesis of the command to fl ee:
When angels take the souls of those who die in sin against their 
souls, they say: “In what (plight) were ye?” Th ey reply: “Weak and 
oppressed were we in the earth.” Th ey say: “Was not the earth 
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of God spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from 
evil)?” (Qur’an 4:97)39
‘Abd al-Rahim, in his discussion of the duty to seek asy-
lum, notes that the Qur’an places a heavy importance on 
the believer’s obligation to struggle against evil—includ-
ing tyranny, oppression, and persecution.40 However, when 
the struggle is futile, the believer should not submit to evil 
and persecution. Th us, ‘Abd al-Rahim comments on Surah 
4:100:
[T]he Quran then describes those who resign themselves to pas-
sive acceptance of oppression and humiliation as people “who 
have wronged themselves”. For, the argument continues, if they 
happened to be too weak to put up eff ective resistance to tyranny 
and injustice, they should leave those lands (or homes) in which 
they would otherwise be deprived of the dignity and freedom 
which defi ne their very existence as humans.41
Th e Qur’an makes the point rather strongly here that per-
sons are responsible for guarding their God-given dignity, 
and if fl ight is the way to do so, then one has a duty to seek 
asylum.
Th e Qur’an also speaks of seeking asylum as an action 
worthy of reward. In Surah IV, verse 100, the Qur’an says:
He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, fi nds in the earth 
many a refuge, wide and spacious: Should he die as a refugee from 
home for God and His Apostle, his reward becomes due and sure 
with God: and God is Oft -giving, Most Merciful. (Qur’an 4:100)
Th ere is a notion of creation inherent in this verse that dove-
tails with the notion of human dignity given by God. Th e 
creation is a place where the dignity of persons should be 
able to fl ourish. It is God’s intention, ‘Abd al-Rahim notes, 
that
all those who strive in conscious devotion to God and with intent 
to abide by divine guidance will be able to fi nd other lands (or 
homes) in which they can then live in dignity and freedom—as 
they were meant to do by their Creator and Sustainer from the 
very beginning.42
It is good to fi nd in the creation a place where one’s dig-
nity can fl ourish; to do so is an action worthy of reward.
Both the Exodus and the Hijra narratives tell stories 
of persons becoming the guardians of their own dignity 
through the act of fl ight. Th eologically speaking, the chil-
dren of God, endowed by their creator with inherent dignity, 
have an obligation to protect that dignity; God has provided 
for a bountiful creation that enables the possibility of fl ight; 
therefore, the act of fl eeing persecution is an act of moral 
consequence. In these narratives, fl ight is not a condition 
driven by the context of persecution; rather, it is a decision, 
an act, and a defi ning moment. It is not the persecution 
that defi nes the communities in these stories so much as 
their liberation, and that liberation comes through fl ight. 
I believe that, even outside their theological signifi cance, 
these stories can inform receiving state approaches to asy-
lum by helping to reframe the actions of asylum seekers as 
the moral choice of an agent to fl ee persecution.
Conclusion: Th e Demand of a Moral Agent
What can receiving states learn, or more aptly, how can 
receiving states and the people of those states begin to 
reimagine asylum in light of these alternative narratives? 
Asylum seekers are not thrown or washed upon the shores 
of receiving states; asylum seekers are making a moral 
demand in the very act of their fl ight. If it is every person’s 
duty to avoid persecution—even if it is only a person’s right 
to be free from persecution—and the world is a place where 
the opportunity to escape persecution exists, then seizing 
that opportunity is a demand in the Lévinasian sense. By 
starting from this perspective, it may be possible to rethink 
receiving-state asylum policy, which is the broader goal of 
this project.
Th is is particularly true because asylum is intrinsic-
ally an interrelational process. Th e world that God made 
so large, in the Qur’anic formulation, has been shrunk by 
humanity’s insistence on drawing political boundaries. It is 
not enough to physically move away from persecution; in a 
world of states, eff ective protection requires being admitted 
or permitted to cross a border. Th us, in order for an asy-
lum seeker to take advantage of the vast earth’s possibility 
for freedom from persecution, borders must be able to give 
way. Put diff erently, the asylum seeker commits a moral act 
by fl eeing persecution, but the effi  cacy of that act requires a 
relationship with the receiving state where she seeks asylum. 
Flight is a relationship, a priori, and the receiving state is not 
an independent self that can act towards the asylum seeker 
outside of that relationship or overdetermine the asylum 
seeker’s narrative. Receiving states should allow themselves, 
as Butler says, “to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is 
not me, but also to be moved, to be prompted to act … .”43 
If the asylum seeker is the guardian of her own dignity, she 
disrupts the continuum of agency that runs from perse-
cutor to protector. For the receiving state, this means that 
the state is not the lone actor when it comes to protection. 
Understanding the asylum seeker as the guardian of her 
own dignity, whose moral act of fl ight becomes complete in 
the relationship of asylum, challenges the notion of asylum 
as charity. Asylum is not simply something that receiving 
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states grant at their pleasure but a moral response to the 
moral demand of the Other.
I am not arguing that only fl ight fulfi lls the duty of pro-
tecting one’s dignity or that every instance of persecution 
necessitates fl ight. Nor am I arguing that those who do not 
fl ee are not moral agents. Th ere are clearly other ways of 
vindicating ones dignity;44 if we take seriously the stories 
of the martyrs, some vindications of dignity may appear 
antonymous to fl ight. I must also note that acknowledging 
the moral agency of fl ight neither excuses persecution nor 
eff aces the need to end persecution. As Edward Said goes 
to pains to point out, exile is devastating even when it is 
necessary.45
Furthermore, to seek asylum requires the capacity to 
negotiate a host of power dynamics (economic, political, 
and social) that I have not raised here. Particularly when 
we are discussing asylum in a place like the United States, 
those who are able to reach US shores to apply for asylum 
oft en, though not always, have some social, economic, or 
political capital in their country of origin. To suggest that 
the failure to seek asylum is a moral failing or lack of moral 
agency when circumstances circumvent such an opportun-
ity would be uncritical.46 Persons who do not fl ee persecu-
tion are also moral agents, and what it means to recognize 
them as such is the subject of another study. For my pur-
poses, I emphasize that among the ways an individual may 
protect her dignity, the decision to fl ee persecution should 
be seen as the choice of a moral agent—a choice that should 
be recognized for the moral demand it is.
By way of concluding, let me suggest how this project 
may intersect with other developments in the fi eld of refu-
gee studies. Several authors have argued for a critical turn 
to the refugee as a way of thinking through the modern pol-
itical landscape.47 It may be that only by reorienting away 
from state-centredness to exile-centredness can we hope 
to address the refugee reality, both in terms of the persons 
who present themselves and the conditions that make refu-
gees a permanent fi xture of the modern landscape.48 To the 
latter Giorgio Agamben counsels, “inasmuch as the refu-
gee unhinges the old trinity of state/nation/territory—this 
apparently marginal fi gure deserves rather to be considered 
the central fi gure of our political history.”49 Th is exile-
centredness, however, is a process. It is a process that may 
challenge but cannot forego the current state-centric reality. 
It is a process, however, that may begin by recognizing the 
moral agency of refugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore, 
if there is a turn to exile-centeredness, it is important to rec-
ognize that such a perspective has multiple valences.50 As 
a critical category, the refugee or asylum seeker is a limit-
account of the modern political subject,51 but, it also can 
be, as this project argues, an account of the moral demand 
of the Other.
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